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While I was at UCLA in the late '60s and early '70s, tout le
monde was a collectivist of one stripe or another. It was the height
of the Vietnam War, a time when, in the words of Justice Douglas,
we were bombing innocent peasants "whose only 'sin' [was] a de-
sire for socialized medicine to alleviate the suffering of their fami-
lies and neighbors."1 It was a time when every self-respecting col-
lege campus had its spring demonstrations and sit-ins promoting a
cornucopia of causes, and when capitalism was a synonym for fas-
cism. The cure for what ailed us, everyone seemed to agree, was
greater, deeper, more extensive government involvement in our
lives. And the sooner the better.
Having left the popular vision of Utopia-a country whose
government attempted to solve everyone's problems-only a few
years earlier, I found this naive, or worse. And I said so, often and
forcefully, to the dismay of my colleagues and professors who
thought I was much too smart to hold such troglodyte views. When
I confronted them with the hard reality of what life was like be-
hind the Iron Curtain, I received various evasive or glib answers:
"You have to give collectivism a chance to work," or "there are
different forms of collectivism," or "Romania and the other East-
ern bloc countries would do better if they were more like Sweden."
"You're exaggerating," still others would argue, "at least they don't
have crime, racism, pollution and huge disparities in wealth, the
way we do." And so on. In the years I spent at UCLA, I doubt I
managed to wean even three people away from the sweet morphia
of collectivism. Faith in the power of benevolent government is
very difficult to shake.
Events in Eastern Europe over the last couple of years should
prove an embarrassment to many. People in this country should be
reconsidering their fundamental assumptions about what govern-
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ment can and should do, and what it should not. Surprisingly, this
has not happened. Government at all levels grows bigger and more
powerful, it absorbs more of our productive resources than ever
before, and its involvement in our daily lives increases unabated.
Even as the peoples of Eastern Europe strive to, establish free mar-
ket economies, implement private property rights and diminish the
role of government, the United States continues on a path headed
in the opposite direction. We have been so busy gloating over the
triumph of our system, and so anxious to offer-the Eastern Europe-
ans advice on how to run their new lives, that we have hardly
paused to consider what we might learn from their bitter
experience.
In all likelihood, the people of Eastern Europe will do just
fine, despite some of the bad advice that may come from the
West.2 Having lived through the dreary hopelessness of collectiv-
ism, they will eventually and unavoidably turn to free markets and
private property. The transition to capitalism may take time, it
may be painful, but it is inexorable.
The more pressing question is: How about us? Are we to learn
anything at all from the disaster that befell hundreds of millions of
people for so many decades? I posed this question to a friend of
mine, a committed statist. Her answer was simple and not particu-
larly encouraging: "What we -have learned from the experience of
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," she told me, "is that you
need capitalism to make socialism work." In other words, capital-
ism must produce what socialism is to distribute. That, in essence,
is the lesson many of our policymakers draw from the cracking of
the Iron Curtain and the wasteland we have discovered behind it:
so long as you leave production in private hands, more or less, you
can let the government do whatever meddling it cares to. The idea
that things may be improved by decreasing government involve-
ment in the economy-and in every other aspect of our lives-is
still viewed as a quaint eccentricity, a pre-New Deal anachronism.
It is tempting to say that I am describing a phenomenon lim-
ited to' a tiny liberal elite-a view popular only inside the Wash-
ington Beltway, in a few state capitals and on college campuses.
When Vaclav Klaus, Czechoslovakia's new Minister of Finance, visited New York
early last year, a leader of a leftist group gave him the group's book about corporate
America. His response was appropriately cool: "If this is 'another effort to make a third way
between capitalism and communism, we have tried this. We wanted to create a New Man,
with only unselfish thoughts. I am afraid it is not possible." John H. Fund, Czechoslovakia's
Free-Market Minister, Wall St J A12 (Mar 2, 1990).
[58:575
Dark Lessons of Utopia
It's tempting but it's not true. We, no less than any other nation,
have the government we deserve. The fact is, the vocabulary of po-
litical dialogue in the United States is undergirded by a variety of
statist assumptions: solutions to social problems begin with gov-
ernment appropriations and the establishment of blue-ribbon gov-
ernment task forces, new agencies are needed to handle new
problems or oversee new industries, and budgets of existing agen-
cies cannot be cut without jeopardizing their missions. Based on
these assumptions, we believe that a successful president is one
who gets most of his legislative program passed, a successful legis-
lator is one who authors bills that reach the statute books and a
landmark Congress is one that passes a lot of laws. No one gets
elected on a promise to do nothing; few incumbents campaign by
listing laws they have managed to get repealed. When a problem
arises-whether economic dislocation, a natural disaster, a dreaded
disease, an infestation of rodents or a water shortage-politicians
fall all over themselves to get on television and explain how they
plan to spend taxpayers' money to solve it. I can't remember a sin-
gle time when a journalist or constituent asked a public official
about a problem, no matter how trivial, and the politician an-
swered that handling it wasn't in his job description.
In a society that prides itself on individualism, self-reliance,
personal initiative and independence, we consistently elect officials
whose instinct is to solve our problems through government pro-
grams. Few people, it seems, have acknowledged a connection be-
tween what's happening in Eastern Europe and what's going on
here. Perhaps it's time to state the obvious.
I. COLLECTIVISM AND FREEDOM: NATURAL ENEMIES
The lifting of the Iron Curtain has revealed societies that are
the very antithesis of what Marxist ideology and its American
apologists had predicted. The theory of collectivism, in one of its
many variants, posits that people are naturally hardworking and
productive, regardless of economic reward. If the government as-
sures that people receive a decent living and if it allows them total
freedom to choose their vocations, everything will get done through
volunteer labor and, as the slogan goes, the fruits of production
will go "[f]rom each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs."3
' Karl Marx (Saul K. Padover, trans), Critique of the Gotha Program, in Robert C.
Tucker, ed, The Marx-Engels Reader 531 (Norton, 2d ed 1978).
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In light of recent events-or even simple common sense-it is
difficult to understand how educated, supposedly intelligent
human beings could cling to this notion. You don't need clairvoy-
ance to realize that a system of total free choice divorced from eco-
nomic incentives would produce a vast overabundance of restau-
rant critics, movie stars, and surfing instructors, but a drastic
shortage of rendering plant workers, highway button layers, and
septic tank cleaners. On the consumption side, one would expect
people to eat filet mignon instead of Spam, to drive Cadillacs in-
stead of riding buses, and to shop at I. Magnin instead of K Mart.
Without a price system to allocate resources and create incentives,
there is no way to match up supply and demand, talent and job
requirements.4 Even if one assumes a central authority with the
efficiency of a computer and a superhuman ability to perceive ev-
eryone's abilities and preferences, there is no way to make it all
work because things just can't be matched up.
And, of course, they weren't. The Fabian notion that the state
would wither away as everyone went about doing what they were
supposed to and consumed no more than what they "needed" gave
way in collectivist economies to perpetual shortages, mandatory
50-, 60- or 70-hour work weeks, appalling medical care and a police
state of monstrous proportions. Massive resource misallocations,
shoddy workmanship and allocation of goods by favoritism, graft
and queuing became the hallmarks of the collectivist state.5 Collec-
' One of the most serious problems facing Eastern European policymakers may be
grasping the fundamental role of the pricing system in spurring supply and tempering de-
mand. Just how little they understand the workings of the invisible hand was demonstrated
to me in a conversation I had with an economist during my visit to post-revolutionary
Romania. I suggested that the most important thing would be for the government to get
resources into private hands by sale, gift or lottery-the initial allocation mechanisms mat-
tered little. He agreed in theory, but was concerned over what would happen if all the land
were in the hands of private farmers and one year they happened to grow too much rice and
too little wheat to sustain the population. He concluded that this was a risk Romania could
not take.
6 See, for example, Paul Craig Roberts and Karen LaFollette, Meltdown: Inside the
Soviet Economy 7-74 (Cato Institute, 1990). Discussing the chronic struggle to obtain food
in the Soviet Union, Roberts and LaFollette state:
Even the homeless on the streets of urban America, if they wished, could readily obtain
edible cabbages, potatoes, bread, animal fat, sugar, salt, the occasional soup bone, and
dairy products-the basic Soviet diet-from the garbage bins of grocery stores. Indeed,
the American poor eat much better than this.
Id at 44. The housing situation faced by Soviet citizens is not much better. The government-
supplied housing is notoriously shoddy and, according to Soviet statistics, per capita living
space is about 97 square feet in Moscow (a two-room apartment to house four people) and
75 square feet in the rest of the country. Based on reports from the Soviet Union, the au-
thors believe the situation is actually worse than the official statistics suggest. Id at 52.
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tivist agriculture has been termed a "disaster" due to chronic labor
and capital equipment shortages.' And while government officials
attempted to control all aspects of the economy, they neglected the
harm that industry and agriculture inflicted on the environment.7
But, in the words of Joe E. Brown, nobody's perfect.8 Even if
collectivist economies did not perform up to par, the tradeoff
might have been acceptable if they achieved some of socialism's
other goals. Collectivism, after all, promised brotherhood first and
abundance only second.' All might have been forgiven if collectiv-
ism had brought about a happier, more tranquil, less harried exis-
tence. It is better to be poor and happy than rich and miserable,
although admittedly it's a close call. But it is precisely in this re-
spect that collectivism had its most stunning failures. By every
conceivable standard, collectivist states fell short of their expecta-
tions, failing to provide even a minimally acceptable quality of life
for their citizens.
Consider the promise of equality. Collectivist theory teaches
that differences in wealth and power must be leveled so that every-
one stands on an equal footing: the janitor and the company presi-
dent, the peasant and the commissar, the septic tank cleaner and
the Secretary General. All citizens would call each other comrade
because they would each be considered equally important in carry-
ing out the glorious mission of the collectivist state.
To articulate the proposition, however, is to ridicule it. Few
modern societies have been as stratified as those under collectivist
rule. In the Eastern European countries that were under such rule,
the same people controlled both the political and the economic
power. This powerful elite demanded and enjoyed a high standard
of living, leaving the rest of society with a standard of living that
was appallingly low. In the Soviet Union, for example, members of
the party elite were and continue to be entitled to a variety of
privileges, among them better food, schools and housing, in addi-
6 Id at 45.
7 Id at 32-37. Roberts and LaFollette report that all major seas and lakes in the Soviet
Union are dying and that drinking water is scarce in many regions. Id at 33. While U.S.
industries discharge about 2.7 billion pounds of toxic chemicali into the atmosphere each
year, industries in the Ukraine alone emitted 22 billion pounds of toxic substances into the
air in 1988. Id at 32.
3 Billy Wilder, Some Like it Hot (United Artists, 1959).
' Although the ordering is not absolute. Recognition that a minimum level of economic
well-being was a prerequisite for the success of the true Marxist state was Lenin's hallmark
modification of Marx's doctrine. Of course, this principle has served as a convenient excuse
for the rulers in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.
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tion to the use of servants, cars and party-owned vacation homes.10
They shop in special stores that stock higher-quality food, scarce
consumer goods and luxury items. The higher the official's rank,
the higher quality special store he can enter.1' The Soviet model is
a typical arrangement in collectivist economies.
No less striking were the inequities perpetrated on the basis of
immutable characteristics such as ethnicity, religion and gender.
Stories about the official Romanian persecution of ethnic Hungari-
ans are now commonplace. 2 Less well documented, but far more
pervasive, was the harassment by straw bosses at all levels of em-
ployees under their control. An individual's job in a collectivist
economy is often that person's only opportunity for earning a live-
lihood. Because a state-controlled economy does not allow for com-
petition among enterprises in the same industry, an employee can-
not just switch to working the same job for a competitor; a job
change often requires a change in industry and the acquisition of
new job skills. Because employees were largely immobile under the
collectivist regimes, they were at the mercy of their supervisors'
demands, reasonable or unreasonable. In most cases, the collectiv-
ist state reenforced the boss's tyrannical authority by making un-
employment an economic crime against the state, often labeled
"parasitism," which carried significant penalties. While employees
had a right to fair treatment, at least in theory, the universal prac-
tice was to the contrary. Ethnic and religious discrimination was a
well-known reality; sexual harassment a fact of life.
I recall vividly how I first learned the extent of this problem.
During a trip back to Romania in the early '70s, I struck up a con-
versation with a man in a small town near Timisoara. He had two
10 Roberts and LaFollette, Meltdown at 67-74 (cited in note 5). The formal structure of
the elite ruling classes in various Eastern European countries even spawned authoritative
secondary sources cataloging the various privileges available to different ranks and listing
the members of the elite. See, for example, Albert Loren Weeks, The Soviet Nomenklatura:
A Comprehensive Roster of Soviet Civilian and Military Officials (Washington Institute,
1987); Michael S. Voslenskii (Eric Mosbacher, trans), Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling
Class (Doubleday, 1984).
11 Roberts and LaFollette, Meltdown at 70 (cited in note 5).
12 See, for example, Robert Cullen, Report from Romania: Down with the Tyrant, The
New Yorker 94, 94-95 (Apr 2, 1990); Celestine Bohlen, Evolution in Europe: Ethnic Rival-
ries Revive in East Europe, NY Times Al (Nov 12, 1990). On the "notoriously difficult" life
of Gypsies in Romania under Ceausescu, see Jesse Bryant Wilder, For Roms: old ills, new
riches, TIhe Plain Dealer 7-B (Dec 27, 1990). Wilder reports that Gypsies have fared better
under the new government, both politically and economically. They have formed their own
political parties and have taken advantage of the open borders to bring Western goods into
Romania to sell on the black market. They often thrive in the unregulated markets, which
allow them to avoid the discrimination they encountered as factory workers.
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grown children, a son and a daughter. I asked whether they were
going to the university. He said yes as to the daughter, but no as to
the son. I asked whether his daughter was a lot smarter than his
son. He said no, but. added that it's far better to step with your
boot into cow manure than to take off your boot and fill it with
manure. I must have looked baffled because he explained: the son
would take care of himself, but the daughter, unless she was armed
with a superior education, would be constantly harassed for sexual
favors by her supervisors. I asked him how he knew. He responded
that he was himself a supervisor.
Collectivist societies, as we are now well aware, largely obliter-
ated the liberties and privileges we consider essential in a civilized
society: speech, religion, assembly, access to the courts, privacy of
body and place of abode. This all-encompassing repression was a
direct consequence of the collectivist economic systems. The gov-
ernments gained complete and pervasive control over their citizens
largely because they controlled all production processes, all chan-
nels of commerce and all means of transportation. Every citizen
knew that his job, food, home, medical care and means of transpor-
tation-everything he needed to survive-were provided, and
could be cut off, by the government. These societies perfectly illus-
trated the idea that freedom is an indivisible concept: economic
freedom is intimately related to, and is a prerequisite for, other
types of freedom. Political and intellectual freedom cannot be
achieved without economic freedom.13
In Romania, for example, the economic system made it virtu-
ally impossible for an individual to publish or broadcast his views.
Private citizens did not have access to printing presses and could
not obtain sufficient paper or ink. The government even outlawed
private ownership of photocopiers and required registration of
typewriters. And individuals certainly did not have access to
broadcast facilities.14
13 For a detailed and lucid explication of this idea, see Milton Friedman, Capitalism
and Freedom (Chicago, 1982).
14 A Romanian union representative described the difficulty of undertaking a serious
organizing effort:
We have no office, no telephone, no staff, and no means to acquire any of this. Also our
country is without the infrastructure that could facilitate an organizing effort. For ex-
ample, the television and radio are run by the government.
We want a newspaper for our union, but consider the obstacles. First of all, there is a
paper shortage. We would likely have to receive paper from overseas. Second, all publi-
cation facilities are owned by the state. An opposition organization would need its own
typesetting and printing equipment. And then we would need a van to deliver the
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Similarly, the Romanian people could not practice their reli-
gions-even clandestinely-because the government made sure
they lacked the necessary texts and ceremonial articles. A further
impediment to any semblance of religious life was the lack of lei-
sure time. Between long work hours and the time spent scrambling
for the rudiments of survival, laboring for the state on weekends
and attending political rallies, Romanians rarely had time for any-
thing else.
The economic deprivation and lack of free markets under the
collectivist regimes also interfered with personal privacy in ways
that would shock Americans. In our society, individuals demand
their own space and consider their homes to be their castles. But
how much can personal privacy mean in Romania and other East-
ern European countries, where several families often live in one
apartment and share one toilet (which may or may not work)? In
Romania under Ceausescu, the citizens never really knew when
their phone lines were tapped, whether their workplaces and
homes were bugged, or whether their mail had been read by gov-
ernment officials. 15 Fundamental decisions regarding reproduction
and sexuality simply couldn't be matters of individual choice be-
cause modern means of contraception were unavailable, even
where permitted by law." In short, state control permeated virtu-
ally every aspect of personal, family and community life.
Far worse than the individual effects of these measures was
the total loss of dignity visited upon the population. Life in a col-
newspapers.
Interview of Catalin Croitoru, president of" the newly formed Union of Pre-University Edu-
cators of Romania, by Ruth Wattenberg, Ceausescu's Schools, American Educator 12, 22-23
(Fall 1990).
15 I learned the extent of this type of intrusion when I corresponded with friends in
Romania during the early '70s. One day I received a letter written in Romania but post-
marked in Germany. Not signed, the letter directed me to discontinue writing to friends in
Romania because the correspondence was placing them in danger. I was baffled by the re-
quest because it did not specify which friends I should stop writing to. It was not until some
years later, when I next visited Romania, that I learned what had happened: each person I
had been writing to had been questioned by the police about the correspondence. One friend
became so concerned that he gave my address to people who were planning to visit Germany
so they could tell me to stop writing. Even though the letter was to be sent from outside of
Romania, he was reluctant to give his name.
26 The Ceausescu regime explicitly coerced reproductive choices by essentially forcing
Romanians to have children in an effort to supply abundant cheap labor:
First, you were fined if you did not have a child by a certain age. And if you had three
children or more, you received a pay bonus.
A nd there were actually policies to encourage high school girls to have children.
Croitoru Interview, Ceausescu's Schools at 15 (cited in note 14).
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lectivist economy was one long struggle for survival. For the mil-
lions who were not members of the ruling elite, day-to-day exis-
tence meant long hours of menial work at low pay, followed by
more long hours waiting in lines for such luxuries as bread, fresh
meat and toilet paper. 17 Weekends were often spent doing "volun-
teer" work, repairing roads or clearing corn fields for the
government.
At every turn, the individual was confronted with powerful,
mean-spirited representatives of the state' who threatened abuse if
they weren't paid off in money or black market luxuries such as
coffee or Western cigarettes. Medical care, which was supposedly
everybody's right, often could not be obtained at all, and never
without greasing the palm of the dispensing physician or
paramedic.' 8 Such power could only be wielded because all chan-
nels of authority originated in the state. There were no private al-
ternatives, no way to circumvent the state-established and main-
tained power structure.
Another of the monumental failures of the collectivist system
was education. While, in theory, collectivism assured everyone the
right to pursue whatever career their talents warranted, the reality
was much different. As part of the central planning process, the
state determined each year how many doctors, lawyers, engineers,
mathematicians and architects would be needed. The number was
usually far less than the number of young people wishing to enter
the field.
The chokepoint for a young person's career hopes usually
came in the summer following graduation from high school. Those
students hoping for a college education applied for the few availa-
ble university positions; admission decisions were ostensibly made
by use of standardized test scores. In practice, many university
slots, like everything else, were allocated to those whose parents
had connections or were willing and able to bribe university offi-
cials with large sums of money or exotic luxuries. The few remain-
ing spots went to the very ablest of the large group of applicants.
17 1 was reminded of the precariousness of most Romanians' lives during my last visit. I
was introduced to a woman who is my counterpart in Romania, a judge for the national
court system; her husband is a lawyer. Although not part of the ruling elite, their family
income no doubt is in the upper five percent of the population. During the conversation I
learned she had a daughter about the same age as one of my children. I asked her if she
planned to expand her family and she said that she didn't think so; she did not see how she
could face the stress of the daily struggle to obtain milk or baby formula for an infant, not
to mention the myriad of other things a child needs to prosper.
" See Roberts and LaFollette, Meltdown at 56-63 (cited in note 5).
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The government denied the multitude who were not lucky
enough to get into the university any opportunity to work in their
chosen field. For them, all possibility of professional development
was cut off; they were relegated to life on an assembly line or some
other unskilled or semi-skilled work. 19 Every summer, tens of
thousands of aspiring high school graduates saw their lives literally
crumble before their eyes, any hope for a fulfilling career and eco-
nomic improvement snatched away from them forever.
Examples of major and minor ways in which collectivist socie-
ties frustrated individual development could easily fill several
volumes. The degree of frustration, personal humiliation and eco-
nomic deprivation suffered by the many millions of people impris-
oned behind the Iron Curtain is difficult to comprehend by those
who have never lived under that system. Suffice to say that the
reality of the system in operation crushed with a vengeance any
idealistic aspirations collectivist planners may have had in estab-
lishing and promoting centrally planned societies.
II. IT COULDN'T HAPPEN HERE. OR COULD IT?
In surveying the rubble left by decades of collectivist rule in
Eastern Europe, it is easy to forget that the system was built on a
high-minded and idealistic premise, namely, that by taking power
away from individuals and by placing it in the hands of the state,
one would achieve a more just, more prosperous, better-ordered so-
ciety. Going at least as far back as Thomas More, there has been a
pervasive and hardy notion that what individuals can do sepa-
rately, by pursuing their own individual interests, the state can do
much better if only it has the resources and the authority to make
the same decisions in a centralized fashion.20 Many of the individu-
als who supported collectivism in Eastern Europe, and who worked
and fought for its implementation, were firmly convinced that they
were helping to found Utopia. How, then, did things go so wrong so
quickly? One could dismiss the entire collectivist experiment as a
poor job of implementation, a good idea badly carried out. To do
19 This result may have been completely in line with the society Ceausescu sought to
build. Catalin Croitoru stated that the dismal condition of the Romanian education system
reflected "the Communists' aversion to intellectuals and intellectual life." Croitoru Inter-
view, Ceausescu's School's at 16 (cited in note 14). He explained that the main purpose of
the government "was to have cheap labor ... as fast as possible" for both agriculture and
factory work. Id at 14. The regime's low opinion of intellectual work "was conveyed by the
dilapidated school buildings, the lack of textbooks, the displacement of academics by propa-
ganda, and by the very low salaries paid to teachers." Id at 16.
20 Sir Thomas More (Robert M. Adams, trans), Utopia (Norton, 1975).
[58:575
Dark Lessons of Utopia
so, however, is to sell short the idealism and good will with which
many collectivist societies were founded, and to shut one's eyes to
what happened once the state took it upon itself to run every as-
pect of the social order.
The problem lay not with the implementation of collectivism,
but with its central premise. Quite simply, the state cannot take on
the job of making all, or even a substantial number, of the impor-
tant decisions in a society. The government can make and enforce
laws, it can police, it can adjudicate, but it cannot decide what is in
everybody's best interests. People's talents, needs, aspirations,
goals and limitations are too diverse and conflicting for any central
authority to take account of.
And even if it could, that power would carry the seeds of its
own destruction. An essential aspect of life as a human being is the
right and the power to make decisions about one's existence, to
succeed or fail on one's own. Utopia carried its own resounding ref-
utation. Even if one shared More's assumptions about what consti-
tutes an ideal society, who would want to live there? A system that
does not allow for failure also does not allow for the self-fulfillment
that comes from striving; failure on one's own terms can be far
more satisfying than bland security. What purpose is there in liv-
ing if all essential decisions from cradle to grave are made by
someone else?
Concentrating power in one central authority carries with it
more palpable dangers as well. As should be clear by now, the state
cannot repeal the laws of economics; there is no fixed demand for
shoes, bread, automobiles, leisure or any other resource, and no
fixed supply of people willing and able to engage in particular oc-
cupations. The only satisfactory way of matching up supply and
demand for goods and services is through a pricing mechanism
that allows individuals to take account of opportunity costs when
making decisions.
Finally, there is grave danger in placing too much power in the
hands of a few individuals. Honesty and good will can only go so
far in preventing abuses of power. The sad experience of the collec-
tivist economies proves what should have been obvious all along:
unless a society has competing sources of power, those in control
will take advantage of their authority to promote themselves and
their friends at the expense of everyone else.
These lessons appear remote and irrelevant because we are a
long way from a collectivist society. We rely, for the most part, on
capitalism to furnish goods and provide employment; we have a
system of limited government, with a Constitution and laws to con-
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strain our public officials; and the government power that does ex-
ist is balanced in many respects by the power of private entities,
civic and commercial. We seem to be far indeed from the type of
societies that we have seen crumbling in Eastern Europe.
Unfortunately, however, we appear to be headed in that gen-
eral direction. We may be safe for some time and, indeed, our sys-
tem may have enough safeguards to keep us from ever getting
there completely. But to the extent we seem to be adopting some
of the operating assumptions of collectivist societies, we risk mak-
ing some of the same mistakes-mistakes that may cost us dearly
in the long run.
The architects of collectivism sought to achieve goals that are
not all that different from those most people consider desirable.
Collectivism promised prosperity and sought to achieve it by
avoiding the "chaos" of capitalism and substituting the more or-
derly-and hence more "efficient"-system of government plan-
ning. Collectivism promised greater individual self-fulfillment by
freeing persons of the economic pressures of a market society.
Equality in wealth, status and power among individuals is another
goal central to a collectivist system; so is the right to be free from
hunger, homelessness or inadequate medical care. While one may
reasonably dispute whether all of these goals are the proper objects
of government control, few would disagree that they are desirable
attributes of a modern society.
There is only a very small step, however, between recognizing
a goal as desirable and concluding that it is one that government
should promote. And it is only a very tiny step further to say that,
if.the goal is so desirable, perhaps we can shift the cost of achiev-
ing it to someone else in society. The two small steps are so simple,
and by now, so reflexive, that most policymakers hardly bother to
articulate them. Yet they are a prescription for a limitless expan-
sion Of government authority. There is an endless supply of
problems we would love to have solved at the other fellow's ex-
pense. And the other fellow, of course, feels the same way.
The simple fact we should have discovered from our experi-
ence, and should have no remaining doubt about upon examining
the shambles left by the collectivist societies, is that there is a limit
to what government can accomplish. Even a government as power-
ful and intrusive as Ceausescu's Romania can control only a small
fraction of the decisions in a society; individuals make many mil-
lions of decisions each day, adjusting their behavior in light of the
government's actions. The more policymakers seek to accomplish
and the more heavy-handed their actions, the more likely they are
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to change existing incentives, triggering a series of behavioral ad-
justments. Every purported solution creates a ripple effect which,
in turn, creates a new set of problems, sometimes more serious
than those it attempted to solve.
Examples of this phenomenon in the United States are far too
numerous to catalogue; a few will suffice. Occupational licensing is
one of the most widespread and universally accepted forms of gov-
ernment regulation. After all, who could possibly object to having
the state certify that the guy who removes your appendix didn't
get his training from Oscar Mayer? Following this logic, some 800
occupations and professions are licensed by one or more states.21 A
recent study by the FTC Bureau of Economics concludes that
much of this licensing is unnecessary and counterproductive. Some
occupational licensing schemes do not achieve the goal of raising
professional standards, yet they increase prices to consumers. 22
Even when the licensing achieves the goal of increasing compe-
tence among providers of the service, consumers are not necessa-
rily better off. "Price increases due to licensing may cause some
consumers to 'do without' the service, or to 'do it themselves.' ")23
The costs to consumers-implicit and explicit-can be staggering.
In the dental profession, for example, the out-of-pocket cost to
consumers of restrictions on the use of dental auxiliaries such as
hygienists-restrictions that do not enhance the quality of ser-
vices-is estimated to have been as much as $700 million in a sin-
gle year."'
The consumer welfare effect of occupational licensing only
tells part of the story, of course. Denial of a professional license,
even temporarily, can have a devastating effect upon the career of
an aspiring professional. Imposing such burdens on individuals
might be legitimate if we were convinced that it would increase
consumer welfare; such imposition is wholly unacceptable, how-
ever, when it results in a net decrease in consumer welfare. In the
latter situation, of which there appear to be many, the attempt to
do one right results in two wrongs.
" Carolyn Cox and Susan Foster, The Costs and Benefits of Occupational Regulation
v (FTC Bureau of Economics, 1990). This logic seems to be rather attenuated in some cases.
Some states require licensing of boxers, horticulturists, butter makers and falconers. Id at 3.
California licenses 132 occupations, including auctioneers, repossessors, pest controllers and
funeral directors. Cal Bus & Prof Code §§ 5730, 7502, 8505.2 and 7617 (West, 1990).
22 Cox and Foster, Occupational Regulation at v (cited in note 21).
23 Id at viii.
24 Id at 30.
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Rent control, which has been imposed in a large number of
communities, is another example of how well-intentioned regula-
tion can have perverse effects. Despite some cynical suggestions to
the contrary, I assume that most rent control schemes are passed
in a good faith effort to even the balance of economic power be-
tween landlords and tenants so as to achieve rentals that are fair to
both parties. But good intentions cannot repeal the laws of eco-
nomics. Rents are usually high for a reason: they represent the
market-clearing prices for housing. Rent control does nothing to
ameliorate the underlying supply and demand conditions, and
often exacerbates the problem by decreasing the market incentive
to increase the housing stock. At the same time, tenants in rent-
controlled apartments are less likely to move out or switch to
smaller units, thus overusing the limited supply of housing. The
perverse effects of rent control are too well-documented by now to
require much elaboration.25
A scheme with similarly perverse outcomes was the odd/even
gas rationing adopted by several states, including California, dur-
ing the oil crisis of the mid-'70s. The scheme was simple: if your
license plate ended with an odd number, you could buy gas only on
odd-numbered days; if you had even-numbered plates, you could
only fill up on even-numbered days. The goal was to decrease lines
at the gas pumps. No one was really sure how or why it would
work, unless one accepted the naive notion that the lines would be
half as long because only half the cars could buy gas on any one
day.
Odd/even rationing made planning ahead more difficult be-
cause one could not be entirely sure how much driving one might
have to do on a no-gas day. Consequently, most drivers were reluc-
tant to let their gas gauges go too low and tanked up more fre-
quently-precisely the opposite effect from that intended. In addi-
tion, being able to buy gas on half as many days roughly doubled a
25 See, for example, Anthony Downs, Residential Rent Controls: An Evaluation (Urban
Land Institute, 1988); Richard J. Devine, Who Benefits from Rent Control? (Center for
Community Change, 1986). Devine examined the effects of California rent control statutes,
particularly those enacted by the cities of Berkeley and Santa Monica. He found that rent
control had failed on its own terms: "[R]ent control has done little to alleviate the af-
fordability problems faced by one out of every three renters. But it has just about guaran-
teed that those who could easily pay more will never have to." Id at 74. Rent control had
also exacerbated the tight housing markets in these cities because it "discouraged for-profit
housing developers and mortgagees from investing in those communities" and "stimulated
the conversion of rental units to owner-occupancy." Id at 66. Devine ultimately concluded
that rent control had largely backfired: "[A]lthough protection of the poor was advanced as
the primary justification for controls, it is the middle and upper-middle classes who have
reaped the major benefits of this legislation." Id at 2.
[58:575
Dark Lessons of Utopia
driver's demand for gasoline on the days he was permitted to buy
gas, resulting in a change in the make-up of the lines at the pumps
but no decrease in waiting time. That government regulators did
not predict this result reflects a lack of understanding of the fun-
damentals of economics evocative of the crumbling economies in
Eastern Europe. Odd/even gas rationing is perhaps the quintessen-
tial example of government action taken simply because everyone
expected the government to "do something" about the problem.
One could go on and on, but perhaps the most stunning exam-
ple of the dangers of government intervention in the economy and
of the failure of government officials to understand the conse-
quences of their actions is the recent collapse of the savings and
loan industry. No doubt it will take many years to identify the cul-
prits in this debacle; perhaps we shall never know who they all
were. But the one thing we do know is that this national disaster is
the direct result of massive regulatory blunders.
At the heart of the regulatory scheme was a system of federal
deposit insurance which, as of 1980, insured deposits up to
$100,000. Deposit insurance seems like one of those great regula-
tory ideas that could have few, if any, detractors. Congress estab-
lished the FDIC in 1933 in response to a wave of bank failures
during the Depression. Bank failures, the rationale went, often
were precipitated by loss of public confidence in otherwise sound
institutions, resulting in bank runs-rushes by clients to withdraw
their funds. Banks, of course, cannot pay off all of their depositors
at once, as they keep only a fraction of deposited funds on hand;
they invest most of their money in loans and other illiquid assets.
Bank runs are thus often fatal, even when institutions are finan-
cially sound. Deposit insurance was meant to assure depositors
that they would always be able to get their money back, thereby
preventing bank runs and promoting the stability of financial
institutions.
Deposit insurance, of course, was only meant to protect finan-
cial institutions from false runs by depositors-runs that are pre-
cipitated by panic rather than legitimate concerns regarding a
bank's soundness. It was never meant to insure against normal
business risks such as bad investments or dishonest managers. But,
as with all insurance systems, deposit insurance created a moral
hazard problem because it allowed S & L executives to spend other
people's money without any downside risk. When the government
created the insurance system, it thus took on a correlative duty to
guard against this moral hazard by overseeing and monitoring the
industry to make sure that S & Ls invested responsibly. The S & L
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crisis was the proximate result of a massive failure of such over-
sight. The reasons for this failure are complex. As we are beginning
to learn, it was due, in part at least, to political pressure from
elected officials seeking to protect troubled financial institutions in
their states.26
More generally, it was a failure of regulation. Having concen-
trated oversight over an entire industry-one holding hundreds of
billions of dollars of other people's money-in a single agency that
did not have the personnel or resources to monitor its activities,
the government created the risk that a mistake could have disas-
trous consequences. It is not necessary to argue that this type of
debacle was inevitable or even very likely; it is enough to point out
that it could not have occurred had deposit insurance been left in
the private sector.
These regulatory blunders provide their lessons at a very dear
price. Estimates of the S & L bailout run as high as $500 billion,
but like others, I believe "there will be higher estimates in coming
months. 1 7 To put this amount in perspective, the entire cost of
World War II, adjusted for inflation, was only $460 billion. Indeed,
$500 billion is greater than the total budget of all of the 50 states
(using fiscal 1987 figures, the latest available), about four times the
1988 profits of all of the Fortune 500 companies, and several hun-
dred times the $1.3 billion the National Cancer Institute spent on
cancer research in 1989.28 What a colossal and tragic waste.
These domestic regulatory failures reflect our misguided faith
in the government's ability to protect society from economic harm,
a premise different in magnitude, but not in character, from that
which provides the impetus for collectivist societies. Such debacles
remind me of the traditional illustration of the mathematical con-
cept of geometric progression-a lake that is slowly being covered
by algae. The lake's owner notices that the algae grows by doubling
in area every day. The owner decides he has plenty of time to deal
with the problem and takes it up when the lake is half cov-
ered-only to discover that he has one day left before the lake is
completely suffocated by the algae.
26 See, for example, Richard L. Berke, Ethics Unit Singles Out Cranston, Chides 4
Others in S. & L. Inquiry, NY Times Al (Feb 28, 1991); Excerpts of Statement by Senate
Ethics Panel, NY Times A20 (Feb 28, 1991); Jill Abramson, Cranston is Only 'Keating
Five' Member Who is Charged with Ethical Misconduct, Wall St J A12 (Feb 28, 1991).
27 Michael Gartner, Biggest Robbery in History-You're the Victim, Wall St J A9 (Aug
9, 1990).
28 Id.
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It may seem to us that our system is far from those recently
discarded by the Eastern European nations, but our complacency
may be no better justified than that of the lake owner. Governmen-
tal intervention into all aspects of our lives-and particularly into
economic matters-is now so pervasive and so readily accepted
that there is really very little that government does not get in-
volved in. At the federal level, there are now 51 major regulatory
agencies; before 1900 there were fewer than ten.2" Even after the
New Deal there were less than 30.30 Until as late as the 1960s, the
industries directly regulated by federal and state agencies ac-
counted for only one-tenth of the GNP. 31 Since then, a number of
agencies have been created to pursue certain policy lines and regu-
late across all industries, for example, the OSHA, EPA and CPSC.
These agencies constrain American businesses at every turn. All
American firms must comply with a confusing array of regulations
relating to their personnel and compensation policies, production
processes and facilities, and products or services.32 The recent in-
crease in environmental regulation has been particularly dramatic.
The EPA now accounts for nearly one-third of federal regulatory
agency spending.33 Its staffing has increased from 3,900 in 1970 to
15,300 in 1990, and its budget has increased accordingly.3 4
The courts too have done their share of regulating business by
means of the tort liability system. This method of shaping business
behavior-settlements and damage awards in tort suits-is partic-
ularly pernicious because it is often at odds with regulations of
other government agencies, 3 is unpredictable in its application
and can impose burdens on society that far outweigh the benefits
to consumers. The number of useful products or services that have
been driven out of the market or made prohibitively expensive be-
cause of the risk of staggering tort liability verdicts is far from de
Murray L. Weidenbaum, Business, Government, and the Public 20-21 (Prentice
Hall, 4th ed 1990).
30 Id at 21.
31 Id at 37.
32 For an illustration of the regulatory problems that might confront a typical American
corporation during a typical board meeting, see id at 1-3. A rough but revealing measure of
the increase in federal regulation is provided by the growth of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. In 1965, the entire set of CFR volumes took up about three feet of shelf space. It took
up nine feet by 1975 and thirteen feet by 1985. One of my law clerks measured the current
set at over seventeen feet. In other words, the CFR has increased nearly six-fold in the last
25 years.
33 Melinda Warren and Kenneth Chilton, Regulation's Rebound: Bush Budget Gives
Regulation a Boost 2 (Center for the Study of American Business, 1990).
34 Id.
11 See Peter W. Huber, Liability 45-61 (Basic, 1988).
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minimis3 6 The drag of our tort liability system on American busi-
nesses also may place them at a competitive disadvantage in both
domestic and international markets.
Although our government is a far cry from the all-encompass-
ing state monoliths that have crumbled in Eastern Europe, one
might be surprised at how much of our national wealth passes
through the government's hands. Federal, state and local govern-
ments together spend more than 40 percent of our national in-
come; at the turn of the century they spent less than 10 percent.3 "
Federal spending on economic and social regulation has increased
dramatically over the past two decades. In constant dollars, spend-
ing on both economic and social regulation tripled during this
time.39 Our federal government has become the world's largest
landlord and tenant, as well as its largest bank, with a loan portfo-
lio equal to the combined portfolios of the nation's 70 largest
banks.4 ° It also runs hundreds of hospitals, the world's largest data
processing system and the world's largest civilian fleet of cars,
trucks and buses.4'
Some of what government does is good, and most of it is well-
intentioned. But our ability to predict the full effects of govern-
mental actions-much less the synergistic effects of hundreds of
thousands of simultaneous government interventions-is very lim-
ited. Far too often there are unanticipated results and costs, de-
35 These include contraceptives, prescription drugs, vehicles, sporting goods, transpor-
tation services and obstetrical and gynecological services. Id at 3-5. Worse still, the threat of
devastating liability prevents many potential products from ever coming to the market. Hu-
ber reports that potential innovators and inventors have "adjusted to the threat of liability
by doing less. Not innovating is a remarkably easy thing to do." Id at 155. He reports that
research expenditures on new contraceptives and vaccines, for example, have plummeted. Id
at 155-56. For other consequences of overdeterrence, see Walter Olson, Overdeterrence and
the Problem of Comparative Risk, in Walter Olson, ed, New Directions in Liability Law 42-
53 (The Academy of Political Science, 1988).
37 Huber, Liability at 229-30 (cited in note 35); Douglas J. Besharov, Forum-Shopping,
Forum-Skipping, and the Problem of International Corpetition, in Olson, ed, New Direc-
tions in Liability Law at 139-48 (cited in note 36).
" Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Tyranny of the Status Quo 15 (Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1983).
39 Warren and Chilton, Regulation's Rebound at 4 (cited in note 33). The authors re-
port that in constant 1982 dollars, spending on social regulation (consumer safety and
health, job safety, energy, and the environment) increased from $2,394 million in 1970 to
$7,174 million in 1991 (projected); spending on economic regulation (finance and banking,
industry-specific, and general business) increased from $3,023 million in 1970 to $8,919 in
1991 (projected).
40 Randall Fitzgerald and Gerald Lipson, Pork Barrel xxxiii (Cato Institute, 1984). The
federal government owns one-third of the total land area of the United States. Id at 47.
41 Id.
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spite the most careful efforts of government officials.42 And the
costs add up: $700 million lost annually on dental care, $500 billion
on account of the S & L crisis and who knows what amount for
each of the other numerous governmental intrusions and interven-
tions into the economy. Assuming we are able to clean up the S &
L mess without severe injury to our economy-something yet to be
seen-how many more such shocks can we sustain without precipi-
tating an economic catastrophe? 4
3
And what about the smaller, more subtle burdens on our eco-
nomic structure as a result of layer upon layer of regulation? How
long can we continue to be competitive in world markets when we
are slowly asphyxiating our productive resources with an endless
stream of laws and regulations at the federal, state and local
levels?
It is possible, of course, to exaggerate the problem. After all,
we continue to have one of the world's most productive economies,
although our lead over many other industrialized nations has dwin-
dled significantly in recent years. And there are surely many legiti-
mate areas of government regulation; if parsimoniously applied,
government oversight may often achieve a net improvement in
overall social welfare. What is alarming, however, is the widely ac-
cepted attitude that government can or must or will have answers
for every problem. This very faith in the omniscience and omnipo-
tence of government led to the establishment of the collectivist ex-
periments we have seen crumble in Eastern Europe. Once this as-
sumption is made, there are few logical stopping points short of
total government control; inexorably, the tendency is to move in
that direction. The sad experience of the hundreds of millions of
human beings trapped behind the Iron Curtain until recently
42 The recent distress in the junk bond market is an example of how government inter-
vention in one area may have unfortunate and unanticipated repercussions in other market
sectors. In its efforts to increase oversight of thrifts, mutual funds and insurance companies,
Congress passed new legislation essentially forcing these institutions to get rid of their junk
bonds. This occurred when the junk bond market was suffering a decline. As a result,
"thrifts, insurance companies and mutual funds were saddled instantly with losses, creating
a snowball effect .... ." Glenn Yago, Regulators, Not Junk Bonds, Sank First Executive,
Wall St J A18 (Apr 16, 1991). Even worse were the effects in the market. The government's
response "turned a market correction into a regulatory rout," virtually "dismantl[ing] the
junk bond market." Id.
43 Some already warn about other sectors of the American financial system, including
commercial banking. One writer blames the "antiquated regulatory structure" and the
"massive failure by policy makers to grapple with the problems that have bedeviled the
financial industry for over a decade." Ron Chernow, Political Cowardice, Financial Panic,
Wall St J A10 (Jan 9, 1991).
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ought to give us pause. It ought to make us take a hard look at
that assumption.
CONCLUSION
In the current spate of constitution-writing, we can only hope
that Eastern Europeans will profit from the dark lessons of Utopia.
For better or for worse, the people of Eastern Europe will reform
their economies and reexamine the assumptions underlying their
systems of government. Although the transition from collectivism
to market democracy will not be easy, they have their own history
and ours to look to for pitfalls and paradigms.
But to paraphrase President Kennedy, we should ask not what
Eastern Europe can learn from us, but what we can learn from
Eastern Europe. Once burned, the people of Eastern Europe are
not likely to fall prey to the notion that all things can be achieved
if only government gets involved. The question is, are we going to
pay heed, or are we destined to make some of the same mistakes
with some of the same consequences?
